Abstract

The analysis of the verbs of psychological states forms a known problem for theories of connectional semantics and syntax (βλ. Grimshaw (1990), Pesetsky (1995)). Recent developments in the field of textual semantics have shown that problems of analysis at the lexical level are desirable and even necessary to be analyzed taking into account a new perspective of textual and endoprotasitic semantics and syntax (Asher & Lascarides (2003), Asher & Pustejovsky (2000, 2004)). The current article supports the analysis of these verbs on the basic idea that semantological parameters of the superprotasitic level influence and isolate those lexical semantic elements that can explain the variable behavior of these verbs. In this study, the focus of this research will be the verbs of psychological states of the New Greek where the semantological role of the “psychically affected” is assigned to the category of the object. In Greek, these verbs of this category are interpreted differently depending on whether the clause is interpreted as “causal” or “agent,” i.e., it is simply a factor without necessarily having a desire for the creation of the psychical state of the agent. The article focuses on the existence of two different consequences that reflect on the verb affecting the inferential level and explaining the behavior of these verbs within the limits of the proposition (Anagnostopoulou 1999).

1. Psychological vs. agentive Object Experiencer predicates

Modern Greek (MGr) Object Experiencer (OE) predicates are divided into two subclasses; psychological and agentive. In the psychological case, the subject of the verb causes the mental state of the experiencer unintentionally and a clitic is always there to double the syntactic case of
the experiencer (cf. (1a) for the ungrammaticality without the clitic doubling compared to (1b)).

(1a)*Το ἐπίπλο ενοχλεί τον Πέτρο.
the furniture.nom bothers the Peter.acc
‘The furniture bothers Peter.’

(1b) Το ἐπίπλο τὸν ενοχλεί τον Πέτρο.
the furniture.nom cl.acc bothers the Peter.acc
‘The furniture bothers Peter.’

In the agentive, in contrast, the subject is attributed the property of being “intentional” in invoking the resulting mental state of the experiencer, the phenomenon of clitic doubling is optional and the subject is always animate.

(2) Ο Γιάννης (τον) ενοχλεί τον Πέτρο.
Giannis.nom (cl.acc) bothers the Peter.acc
‘Giannis bothers Peter.’

Anagnostopoulou (1999) brings evidence that in the agentive reading, the experiencer is assigned structural case and that “it is taken for granted” that its subject is interpreted as being deliberately involved in the creation of the emotional state of the experiencer as in (2). On the other hand, in (1) according to Anagnostopoulou (1999), the object is assigned oblique case in the psychological reading. Additionally, the presence of clitic doubling with an animate subject results in the interpretation of the subject of the verb as psychological without intention and not as agentive.

However, according to Anagnostopoulou (1999), when clitic doubling is present and it is also made clear by context via an adverbial or other modifiers that the subject is “intentional” in invoking the resulting mental state the interpreter arrives at the agentive and not the psychological interpretation as in (3).

(3) Επίτηδες τὸν ενόχλησα τὸν συγγραφέα.
Deliberately cl.acc annoyed/bothered.1sg the author.acc
‘Deliberately, I annoyed the author.’

Furthermore, Anagnostopoulou (1999) indicates that there is a difference in the two readings regarding the treatment of the definite description denoted by the experiencer. The agentive reading has the usual requirement imposed by definite descriptions, namely that the entity denoted by the definite should have been already mentioned or, at least,
build a bridging relation with an object from the previous discourse. Accordingly, one gets a sense of oddity in the two-sentence discourse of (4) since the “author” that is assigned the experiencer role in the second sentence has not been mentioned, or cannot build an indirect relation with an object in the previous discourse.

\[(4) \text{Κάθισα στο γραφείο και μελέτησα.} \]

“I sat at the desk and studied.”

#Επίτηδες τον ενόχλησα τον συγγραφέα.
#Deliberately cl.acc annoyed/bothered.1sg the author.acc.
‘Deliberately, I annoyed the author.’

If there were no adverbial “deliberately” in (4), the psychological interpretation would be recoverable. In this case, the usual requirement imposed by definite descriptions, the psychological interpretation of the subject in these verbs does not require that the definite of the experiencer is mentioned before and its existence is taken for granted. Therefore, the interpreter is willing to be engaged in unusual indirect inferences, in order to build a bridging relation with some object of the previous discourse. In the same context of (4), the psychological interpretation of the subject would force the interpreter to infer that the author is related to the object of the event of reading, a book, in the first sentence. Therefore, the reading would be that the author in the second sentence is the author of a book that supposedly I studied when I sat at the desk. The next sections will do justice to the status of presuppositional lexical information able to analyze the role of the clitic doubling in the psychological reading and the “intentionality” of the subject in the agentive reading to influence the discourse inference and interpretation.

2. The status of lexical presuppositions

Until now, the possibility of clitic doubling and its effects on anaphora resolution have had to be stipulated, though the fact of clitic doubling has been used to support a specific approach on argument structure (Anagnostopoulou 1999). No systematic prediction or generalization about the differing behaviour in the interpretation of the OE predicates has been made on the basis of the above data. I argue that clitic doubling can be understood better from the perspective of an interaction between discourse relations and lexical semantics. In particular, I show that the variable behaviour of OE predicates regarding their interpretation can be understood if one assumes that these verbs entail that the subject is
intentional in performing actions that create the emotional state of the experiencer in the agentive reading. The knowledge that the subject of these verbs in MGr is intentional is reflected by the verbal meaning but is not presupposed, as it will be shown. On the other hand, in the psychological reading a presupposition is triggered by the presence of the doubled clitic, namely that the experiencer is responsible for the creation of the mental state and that the experiencing event depends on the point of view of the experiencer. Additionally, when the subject is animate, the presence of clitic doubling leads to a tendency to interpret the subject as unintentional and therefore to the psychological reading. The interpretation of the definite NPs (cf. (4) for the bridging effect) denoting the experiencer emerges as a side effect of this basic interaction between lexical semantics and discourse structure.

The usual assumption for the interpretation of definite descriptions is that they enter a presupposition as to the existence and uniqueness of the referent of the description. In line with Chierchia (1995) and Asher & Lascarides (2003), this work additionally assumes that definites enter a presupposition that express an underspecified relation between the object they denote and an object from the preceding discourse. The nature of this relation is defined in a context-sensitive way considering pragmatic and other factors. The preliminary observation by Anagnostopoulou (1999) is that the definites representing the experiencer seem to systematically violate the standard principle about their presupposed content when the clitic is there, namely that they should be connected with either an identity relation or some kind of bridging relation with some objects in the preceding discourse. The approach to lexical presuppositions as adopted in this paper follows the classical notion of presuppositions as being necessary preconditions for the felicitous utterance of a sentence and shows that the presupposition triggered by the psychological OE predicates does not insert underspecified conditions, which explains why there is no need to be connected with pieces of the prior discourse.

Before moving on to the analysis, it is essential to motivate the idea of lexical presuppositions of the kind just mentioned. In order to motivate the idea, one needs to show that certain lexical components can be isolated and be proven to influence decisions as to which discourse relations can be inferred and to determine the degree of coherence in the discourse level. Unlike generative approaches to the lexicon (Pustejovsky 1995), the current work draws a clear (as possible) line between world

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1 That happens in the absence of any adverbial that would lead to the agentive reading (see discussion around (4)).
knowledge and linguistically motivated one contained inside the lexical items. This enterprise is generally considered difficult, since one has to:

- analyze the relevant lexical semantic information in detail and distinguish it from encyclopedic knowledge;
- exploit productive information that plays a role in discourse inference and interpretation.

A complication for our assumption about the presence of presuppositions triggered by the lexical level is that there are no overt classical presuppositional triggers (definite NPs, generalized quantifiers, cleft constructions, among others). Instead, I claim that the lexical item includes a set of meaning aspects, elements of which are capable of changing the context potential in diverse ways. Even though presupposition triggers in the classical sense do not appear to be decisive factors in determining the existence of a presupposition, it is essential to consider the role of syntactic information, since for OE verbs clues like clitic doubling or animacy play a crucial role in the choice of the reading.

Before one looks at the way these presuppositions might interact with discourse interpretation, it should be stressed that the connection of lexical semantic representation of the kind represented here with syntax is transparent for any constraint based formalism like LFG (Lexical Functional Grammar) or HPSG (Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar). The current analysis assumes an LFG syntactic setting that provides the relevant information for the case of MGr psych verb constructions.

2.1. The syntax-semantics interface

Based on LFG I assume a straightforward mapping of syntactic features of f(unctional)-structure to semantics, following the linear logic based resource sensitive based account (Dalrymple 2001). In LFG it is simple to encode the instantiation of the lexical entry in the two readings by considering the relevant syntactic information. Namely, I assume that animacy and the presence of clitic doubling are recorded by the features CLITIC and ANIMACY at f-structure. When the subject has a positive value for the ANIMATE feature and there is no CLITIC feature, then this f-structural syntactic information leads to the agentive reading. On the other hand, when a CLITIC feature is assigned a positive value in the syntactic analysis, the psychological reading is more likely. This view of the lexical contribution to the semantic composition in the sentential and intersentential level is in line with the ideas of Pustejovsky (1995) and
Asher & Pustejovsky (2000) about the contribution of the arguments of the verb to the semantic composition. However, unlike generative approaches to the lexicon, the assumptions of the paper are based only on linguistic information reflected in the syntax and only on those lexical semantic elements proven to be able to influence the overall composition. There is no recourse to metaphysically lifted lexical semantic knowledge, but only evidence from syntax and lexical knowledge, the lack of which results in a false or incomplete interpretation.

This approach also differentiates itself from the lexical semantic-pragmatic interface adopted by Pustejovsky (1995) and Lascarides & Copestake (1998), whereby lexical types are embedded in an inheritance hierarchy, provide their default meaning aspects to the semantic composition and can be overridden when pragmatics demands it. This work does not assume a multifunctional lexical representation with direct access to world knowledge and ontology of objects. The main idea is that lexical items have only a partial relation to objects and events of the world that cannot be strictly defined. Therefore, one explores lexical semantic knowledge that can be empirically proven to be relevant for discoursal inference.

2.2. Establishing lexical presuppositions

The role of clitic doubling in the psychological OE MGr psych verbs as activating a specific presupposition can be justified by observing its behaviour under standard tests for the status of presuppositions. The lexical information associated with the point of view of the experiencer in the psychological reading “survives” in the different environments of the “family of sentences” or P-test. Following Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (2000), presuppositions are taken for granted and considered to be necessary preconditions for the felicitous utterance of a sentence. Below, I exemplify how the OE verb ενοχλώ ‘bother’ behaves under negation in (5) and hypotheticals in (6). In (5) and (6) the presupposed information about the point of view of the experiencer is not outscoped by negation or the hypothetical operators and can be related to other utterances. The interpretations of the examples illustrate the need for including the relevant presupposition. In the psychological reading the presupposition of these verbs regarding the “cooperation” or point of view of the experiencer is expressed better as the set of things that affect the experiencer. Additionally, the idiosyncratic part of the verbal meaning specifies the resulting mental state of the experiencer invoked by the psych verb. This analysis constrains the choices as to what properties of
the subject cause the “annoyance” of the experiencer; namely those properties that the experiencer’s cognitive state indicates.

(5) Το ἐπίπλο δὲν τὸν ενοχλεῖ τὸν Πέτρο.  
the furniture.nom not.neg cl.acc bother the Peter.acc  
‘The furniture does not bother Peter.’  
(There is a set of things that bother Peter) and furniture does not belong to that set.

(6) Ἡσώς τὸ ἐπίπλο τὸν ενοχλεῖ τὸν Πέτρο.  
Perhaps the furniture.nom cl.acc bothers the Peter.acc  
‘Perhaps the furniture bothers Peter.’  
(There is a set of things that bother Peter) and perhaps the furniture belongs to that set.

The treatment of presuppositions here follows SDRT’s (Segmented Discourse Representation Theory; Asher & Lascarides 2003) strategy for handling presuppositions compositionally at the discourse level. This means that the interpretation is provided by the set of SDRSs as defined recursively, using a well-defined inventory of rhetorical relations, such as Explanation or Narration to connect segments. The inference of rhetorical relations is conducted by an axiomatic inference engine called DICE, which is responsible for reflecting the contribution of diverse knowledge sources, including lexical and compositional semantics, world and domain knowledge and cognitive modeling knowledge. This ensures that semantic as well as pragmatic knowledge interact and the theory captures much more subtle discourse effects than a dynamic semantic account like DRT (Discourse Representation Theory, Kamp & Reyle 1993). In SDRT, presupposition satisfaction has become part of the definition of discourse update. The algorithm distinguishes the asserted from the presupposed content and as long as it is possible for the presupposed content to be related or “attached” to other segments, it projects out of the embedded context. With respect to psych verbs, I assume that the “responsibility” of the experiencer for the creation of the mental state is a presupposition that influences the discourse inference and interpretation. The psychological reading results when a clitic doubles the case of the experiencer with or without animate subject and the psychological interpretation loosens the requirement for the definite to be bound by some entity in the previous discourse.
3. The interface between Lexical and Discourse Semantics

Asher & Lascarides (2003) argue that lexical semantic knowledge can simplify complex reasoning about the connection of events in the discourse, since it provides “hard-wired” information about the way subevents are related. In this way, event-denoting categories, like verbs and nominals, can transform open-ended reasoning coming from domain or world knowledge into a procedure of filling argument slots in the lexical entries. The lexical semantic representations contain information about rhetorical relations as shown in Figure 1 for the OE English predicate “annoy”. Psych verbs have been analyzed by Asher & Pustejovsky (2000), Asher & Lascarides (2003) and Tantos (2004) as describing a complex causative event of special kind, which has $\pi_1$ and $\pi_2$, whereby $\pi_1$ represents the “causing” subevent, which results in $\pi_2$ and whereby the “causing” $\pi_1$ temporally precedes the resulting eventuality expressed by $\pi_2$. The cause of the resulting mental state is an “experience” kind of subevent as in Figure 1. The question mark in $\pi_1$ indicates underspecified information that is filled in by the context. Briefly, this lexical entry implies that there should be some event from the surrounding context expressing an action of the stimulus “u” that participates in the denotation of the causing $\pi_1$; therefore, the subject “y” experiences “u”, which did something –resolved from the context –, and that something resulted in $\pi_2$, where the experiencer is in the state of being annoyed.

![Figure 1](image-url)

An interesting recent development in this approach (Asher & Lascarides 2003) is the assumption that it is possible and even desirable that lexical items introduce presupposed information and that this presupposed information, as any other usual presupposition, plays an active role in the discourse composition. Consequently, if the subject of the verb “annoy” is an individual entity, like “John”, then “u” in of Figure 1 resolves to someone denoting an individual in the syntax-semantics interface and since in English there is no additional information regarding its “intention” or any of its properties that cause the resulting mental state, it
remains underspecified\(^2\). On the other hand, if the subject of these verbs is a propositional term, then the underspecification in \(\pi_1\) is resolved in a structural way; namely it inserts a presupposition that the content of this proposition is true and this fact has also consequences for the representation.

In Greek, on the other hand, the lexical contribution of these verbs is different, since the two different readings can be distinguished on the basis of their contribution to discourse inference. The psychological reading inserts a presupposition in the discourse level of analysis, which is able to influence inferencing. On the other hand, the “intentionality” meaning component in the agentive reading blocks certain readings and allows others. The need to represent MGr psych verbs in a different way than the English corresponding ones is made transparent when one investigates their different roles in context. The next sections provide the two distinct representations for the two readings and also investigate the consequences and the role of such discourse-based lexical representation to discourse inference and interpretation.

4. The agentive reading

In Tantos (2005), I argued that the “intentionality” of the subject in the agentive reading should be represented as presupposed knowledge that could survive all the environments imposed by the family of sentences test. However, it seems that not all native speakers share this view of the status of the “intentionality” of the subject\(^3\). Therefore, although the intentional state of the subject is part of the verbal meaning and should be included in the lexical entry of these verbs, this paper is not committed to the strong statement that it is presupposed.

The discourse-based lexical contribution of these verbs admits the strategy of SDRT to include two different utterance tokens (\(\pi’s\)) that represent the content of the two subevents denoted by the complex psych

\(^2\) Due to a different focus in this paper, I would not like to get into the debate about the status of proper names; namely whether a proper name (N) should be classified as any other definite description and interpreted as “an individual named N” supported mainly by the quotation theory of proper names (Geurts 1997) or whether they lack a meaning, in the sense of a Fregean sense as a collection of properties which determines the denotation of the name as argued by Kripke (1972). This work is probably closer to Geurts’ idea about the issue.

\(^3\) After testing the intuition of 6 speakers in the presupposition tests, 3 of them agreed that the “intentionality” of the subject is taken for granted and “survives” and 3 thought the opposite.
predicate. The lexical entry for these verbs is illustrated in Figure 2, where the state of the subject being intentional is captured by the “intentional” predication and there is no underspecified condition activated by the subject, unlike in English. The difference between English and Greek agentive OE predicate with respect to this underspecified condition is proven as will be shown,

Let us begin with the lexical contribution of the agentive OE predicates to the sentential analysis of (7).

\( \text{(7)} \) Ο Γιάννης ενοχλεί τον Πέτρο.
The Giannis.nom bothers the Peter.acc
‘Giannis bothers Peter.’

In Figure 3, the sentential analysis of (6) includes the use of the “intentional” predication and there is no underspecified condition as mentioned before.
The semantic representation of (6) renders the intuitive interpretation of the sentence in MGr; that Peter experienced Giannis, who is intentional in invoking the mental state of the experiencer and that as a result Peter is bothered. Essentially, the difference between Greek agentive and English OE predicates is that in English the fact that the subject is intentional or not is inferred in the context via extralinguistic reasoning. In MGr the “intentionality” of the subject is included in the verbal meaning and delimits the causing subevent. The lack of the relevant underspecified condition in the MGr agentive case is the reason why certain readings in the context are preferred whereas others are implausible or are blocked as is discussed in section 5 and in Tantos (2005).

5. The psychological reading

Clitic doubling triggers the lexical representation of OE predicates in the psychological reading. The role of clitic doubling here is to emphasize the participation of the experiencer in the “experiencing” event. This presupposition, as mentioned in section 2.2, is expressed by assuming that the entity denoted by the subject belongs to the set S of the things that invoke the relevant mental state described by the idiosyncratic part of the verb meaning.
Figure 4 encodes the idea that the lexical presupposition is “activated” or “triggered” by the verb in the psychological reading. The asserted content is separated from the presupposed one via the use of metalabels “a” and “p”, correspondingly. Again, these verbs denote a complex event whose subevents are in a causal relation, or a Result between $\pi 3$ and $\pi 4$ in terms of the SDRS-based lexical account. Additionally, the presupposed part of $\pi 5$ is Background to $\pi 2$, namely to the fact that the stimulus either is engaged in some action (if it is animate) or some of its properties (if it is inanimate) belong to the set “$S$” that affect the experiencer.

Let us apply this kind of lexical information to an example like (1b). The lexical contribution of “bother” in the psychological interpretation is illustrated in Figure 5 for the SDRS of (1b). The intuitive interpretation of (1b) is identified with the representation in Figure 5 namely, that Peter experienced the furniture and since there is a set of things that bother Peter and furniture belong to that set, this resulted in him being bothered.
This kind of representation suggests that the fact that furniture belongs to that set is added to the asserted content, and not to the presupposed one. Additionally, by describing that furniture belongs to the set S, which temporally overlaps Peter’s experience of them, provides backgrounded knowledge to $\pi_1$. The reason one should not include it in the presuppositional part is that exactly that information does not project out of embedding contexts, like negations or hypotheticals, and in general fails all the presupposition satisfaction tests. In the negation environment we encountered in section 2.2, the interpretation is that there is a set of things that bother Peter and when he experiences furniture, since it does not belong to that set, he is not getting bothered. Thus, if we admitted that the knowledge that furniture “u” belongs to the set S is presuppositional, then the interpretation of (1b) in its negation would be that: there is a set of things S that bother Peter; furniture “u” belongs to that set and when Peter experiences them, then he is not bothered. This interpretation renders the presupposition about the furniture logically inconsistent and cannot be related or added or “accommodated” to the discourse$^4$. Even the weaker constraints of Van der Sandt’s (1992) theory of presupposition about the accommodation satisfaction (consistency in that case) capture the fact that this statement about the furniture is not a presupposition. The right interpretation in the negation of (1b), however, requires that this knowledge about the membership of furniture to that set is negated and provides backgrounded knowledge to $\pi_1$; There is a set of things that bother Peter and when he experiences furniture, since they don’t belong to that set, he is not getting annoyed.

Assuming a set of objects, along with their properties, as possible causes for the experiencer each time, there is an immediate connection established between the “meaning as denotation” approach of the lexical semantics of the verb and the cognitive state of the experiencer. As a tentative thought, one could claim that exactly this connection makes this verb class idiomorphic and does not allow its classification as purely causative. The specification of that set of things that create the mental state of the experiencer is provided by the cognitive modeling knowledge, exploiting the modular architecture adopted by SDRT. Due to a lack of space, I can not get into more details about this idea.

$^4$ The argument would be:
All the elements of the set (S) bother Peter (bother(S,p)) and the set of furniture F is a subset of S (F $\subseteq$ S); then by Modus Ponens they also bother Peter (bother(F,p)).
But exactly that deduction renders inconsistent the above statement; furniture bother and do not bother Peter.
The next sections deal with the influence of the lexical semantics as represented above for the agentive and psychological reading of OE MGr predicates on the semantic composition of discourses.

6. OE MGr verbs in context

The discourse effects of these verbs depend on the type: psychological vs. agentive. The next section focuses on the “intentionality” meaning component of the agentive use whereas the one after that examines the contribution of the lexical semantics in the psychological reading to discourse inference and interpretation.

6.1. The agentive reading in discourse

The identification of an “intentionality” component in MGr OE psych verbs suggests a possible connection with some verbs called “intentional” by Asher & Lascarides (2003) and Asher & Pustejovsky (2000). These verbs seem to be like the internally caused verbs of Levin & Rappaport (1995). In this paper, I draw an explicit connection between the intentional component triggered by the OE psych verbs when the subject is agentive and the group of “intentional” verbs.

Asher & Pustejovsky (2000) show that a set of agentive verbs do not behave like standard agentive-causative verbs with respect to discourse analysis. For (8), a standard SDRT analysis would predict that the two clauses should be connected via the Explanation rhetorical relation (cf. (9) for the pattern with a standard agentive verb). However, in (8), Narration is intuitively the correct connection between the clauses.

(8) John got up. Max greeted him. (Narration)
(9) John fell. Max pushed him. (Explanation)

In order to be able to account for this contrast, Asher & Pustejovsky (2000) propose that in (8), the intentional verb “get up” generally resembles other agentive-causative verbs, but that it provides its own internal causes for the resulting state of getting up, namely the “intentionality” of the subject. This results in the “intentionality” attributed to John. The inferred relation in (8) is simply Narration and no other complex interaction between the events of these two sentences is implied. Interestingly, the same effect seems to be evident in MGr agentive OE psych verbs. This is illustrated by (10), where an Explanation relation between the two clauses also does not hold.
(10) (π1) Ο Μάριος στενοχώρησε τη Μαρία.
   the Marios  upset     the Maria.acc
   ‘Marios upset Maria.’

(π2) Εκείνη τον προσέβαλε.
   She   him.acc   insulted
   ‘She insulted him.’

In English it would be more preferable to satisfy world knowledge or
cognitive state axioms that would state that usually “insulting” events
cause “upsetting” events to the affectee and therefore an Explanation
relation could be built between π1 and π2. Additionally, there is no
linguistic clue or a difference in the tenses of the two sentences that
would indicate that one should take a different reading. Nevertheless, a
MGr speaker interpretes the events in π1 and π2 to be in a narrative
sequence and additionally it seems even more desirable to choose the
opposite of an Explanation reading, namely a Result according to which
in (10) the upsetting event resulted in the insulting event in the second
utterance. This follows because the “intentionality” of the subject
constitutes the internal causation of the subject for engaging in the
creation of the experiencing event and blocks the immediate access to the
resulting mental state through a causal link. Asher (p.c.) has indicated
that the reason that one does not take an Explanation relation might lie in
the fact that the subject of the second sentence could not be identified
with the subject of the first sentence whose action is underspecified. The
point of underspecification in his analysis has to do with some action that
Marios is engaged in that Maria experienced. However, according to this
idea, since the lexical entry could not be in that case the basis for the
inference of the right relation, one should then use world knowledge,
which would lead to the wrong interpretation that the action in the second
sentence explains the resulting state in π2. Therefore, the presence of this
meaning aspect reflected by the verb is not only helpful but also essential.
The right interpretation in MGr of a discourse like (11) should indeed be
based on cognitive modeling or world knowledge. Only this time it
assumes that the action of the subject of the first sentence is not
explicated in a coming sentence and that the second sentence is just a
narration of the first one or that it elaborates the fact that Marios is
intentional in invoking the mental state and does not explain the resulting
mental state of the experiencer. That means that in MGr the “insulting”
event in the second utterance cannot be the Explanation of the
“upsetting” state in the first one. In other words, there is no right
interpretation if one does not consider the “intentionality” of the subject.
Apart from the difference between English and MGr agentive OE predicates, it seems that in general the “intentionality” of the subject in MGr OE verbs should be included and exploited in favor of the correct reasoning this time conducted with the help of world or cognitive modeling knowledge.

One could claim that this blocking is defeasible and that the presence of the lexical presupposition is only apparently so. When “insult” in the second utterance is in pluperfect as in (12), one could argue that the inference of Explanation can be recovered. However, in this case, the right interpretation in MGr would be that she had insulted him before he “intentionally” causes upset to her. Therefore, the insulting “caused” him to “be” intentional in “upsetting” her. Therefore, an Explanation relation would be inferred between the second utterance and the intentional state implied by the lexical semantics of the verb. In that way one can arrive at the right reading.

(11) (π1) Ο Μάριος στενοχώρησε τη Μαρία.
the Marios upset the Maria.acc
‘Marios upset Maria.’
(π2) (PRO) Την προσέβαλε.
(He) her.acc insulted
‘He insulted her.’
the cooperation and the responsibility of the experiencer holds in that case too. At the same time, since the agentive reading is more prominent it is required that the experiencer entity has already been introduced before or creates a well defined bridging relation with other objects in the context as in any other definite, in order to get that emphasis. Consequently, the current analysis proposes that the class of agentive OE predicates in MGr is separated in two further subclasses: one where the agent’s “intentionality” plays the most important role and another in the presence of clitic doubling where the experiencer plays a more active role. In the second case, both the “intentionality” of the subject and the presupposition about the point of view of the experiencer are activated.

6.2. The psychological reading in discourse

The “responsibility” of the experiencer for the creation of the mental state in the psychological reading does not only affect the interpretation of the sentence, but is also able to influence the inference of rhetorical relations at the discourse level. This is exemplified in (13).

(13) (π1) Το ἐπιπλο τον ενοχλεί τον Πέτρο.
the furniture cl.acc bothers the Peter.acc
‘The furniture bothers Peter.’

(π2) Είναι βρώµικο και ἁσχηµό.
(Pro) is dirty and ugly.
‘It is dirty and ugly.’

The assignment of a truth-value to the second sentence is dependent upon the presupposition about the point of view and preferences of Peter. In this context, the second utterance is interpreted as follows: That “the furniture is dirty and ugly” is true depends on whether it is taken from the point of view of Peter. A truth assignment of the furniture as being dirty and ugly without considering the condition of the point of view of the experiencer is not right. The right interpretation of the above example (following the appropriate enumeration of π’s, whereby after the analysis of the first sentence, the second one is assigned the label π6) is that there is an Explanation relation between π2 and π6, namely that the proposition “the furniture is dirty and ugly” explains the lexical π2, which states that the furniture belongs to the set of things that bother Peter. Exactly this inference would open new ways of thinking about the role of presupposed information in interacting with the topic of the discourse. It also confirms the idea of Asher & Lascarides (1998) that Backgrounds and Narrations construct different kinds of topics.
7. Conclusion

In sum, the paper demonstrates that specialized lexical semantic components, such as intentionality or the point of view of the experiencer, can serve the inference of rhetorical relations and explain the blocking of other relations in the context, as shown for the case of MGr OE psych predicates. Instead of seeking the reasons for the differing behaviour of these verbs in syntax, like Anagnostopoulou (1999) does, this paper provides an analysis in terms of the semantics-pragmatics interface. Additionally, the MGr data further supports the fact that the “intentional” verbs as identified by Asher & Pustejovsky (2000) and Asher & Lascarides (2003) should consist of a discourse-related group of verbs. The data also prove that a deep analysis of the lexical semantics of certain verbs can simplify the discourse interpretation in cases where no domain or world knowledge is of use.

REFERENCES